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INTRODUCTION
Prosecuting and deterring international cartels increasingly
occupies the time and energy of competition authorities around the
world. In order to provide appropriate policy instruments,
policymakers have had to address a range of issues: corporate
amnesty policies, extraterritoriality, building antitrust institutional
capacity in developing countries, and multinational agreements for
competition authorities to cooperate and share information. In a
similar vein, some countries have eliminated or limited previously
existing antitrust exemptions for cooperation among private firms for
exporting goods and services; others, however, have steadfastly
insisted on the importance of maintaining these exemptions.
With increasing consensus, both in favor of freer international
trade and in opposition to price fixing and market division
agreements, these exemptions have come under criticism over the
last decade. By 1991, academics were beginning to call for a change
in policy toward export cartels. "[Export exemptions from antitrust
laws] authorize firms to collaborate to engage in anticompetitive
behavior in foreign markets, at the expense of other countries'
consumers and producers, in a manner that would be unlawful if
undertaken at home."' Spencer Weber Waller, the preeminent expert
in this area, wrote that "the absence of international regulation
pertaining to the use of export cartels leaves a conspicuous gap in the
enforcement of competition norms."2 The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") voiced similar criticism,
1. See A. Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 571 (1991).
2. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading Company
Program, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 272 (1992) [hereinafter Waller,
The Failure of the ETC Program]; see also Spencer Weber Waller, The
Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Country Export
Cartels, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 98, 99 (1989) [hereinafter Waller, U.S. Antitrust
Ambivalence] (arguing that while the "shining success" of U.S. antitrust law in the
latter part of the twentieth century is our strong stance against international cartels
that harm U.S. consumers, we have a "poor history of responding to the challenges
posed by single-country export cartels").
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calling for the "worldwide repeal of cartel exemption coupled with
an efficiency defense."3
Whether in response to these criticisms or broader economic and
political forces, over the last decade many countries have eliminated
or limited explicit antitrust exemptions for exporters and the
associated notification requirements. In part, this reflects an
international movement toward creating stronger cooperation in
competition policy, as well as more uniform rules and enforcement.4
In this article, we document this shift and discuss its implications for
antitrust enforcement and the effectiveness of global competition.
A few countries, such as the United States and Australia, continue
to offer explicit export exemptions. Two questions arise: Is this
antiquated or protectionist thinking on the part of these "hold out"
countries, or is it the correct policy stance? Do we want explicit
exemptions, implicit exemptions, or no exemptions at all? Many
would argue that we should have no exemptions: allowing firms to
fix prices for domestic or export purposes should be illegal. But if
we cannot achieve that goal in the near future, it may be worse, not
better, to have countries moving to implicit exemptions if "implicit"
implies no notification, no ongoing oversight, and increased
uncertainty regarding a firm's vulnerability to foreign antitrust
prosecution. If there are explicit exemptions, they should be based on
considerations of global welfare, rather than "beggar-thy-neighbor"
strategies.5 Countries should work together either to agree to
3. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OBSTACLES TO TRADE AND
COMPETITION 11 (1993).
4. See Report of the Group of 'Experts, Competition Policy in the New Trade
Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules, 9 (European Comm'n
1995) (recommending increased cooperation among competition authorities
around the world). One of the reasons for its recommendation is that "there are
more and more competition problems which transcend national boundaries:
international cartels, export cartels, restrictive practices in fields which are
international by nature (e.g. air or sea transport, etc.), mergers on a world scale ...
or even the abuse of a dominant position on several major markets .... Id.
5. See Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, A Multilateral Framework for
Competition Policy?, in THE SINGAPORE ISSUES AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: THE ROAD TO CANCUN AND BEYOND 136 (Simon J. Evenett & the Swiss
State Secretariat of Economic Affairs eds. 2003) ("Moreover, it is difficult to see
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eliminate export exemptions or to adopt explicit exemptions that are
jointly monitored. The current patchwork of implicit and explicit
exemptions is the least favored approach.
This paper presents an overview of different types of "pure"
export cartel exemptions (i.e., those intended exclusively for trade in
foreign markets), documents their changing international status, and
discusses the reasons for these changes.6 Our use of the term "export
cartel" is not meant to imply that the member firms are able to
exercise market power, but simply that they have been granted
permission to engage in activities that cartels behave in, such as
fixing prices. An "export cartel" or "export association" is simply a
group of firms that nations permit to work together (sometimes with
clear restrictions specifying over which dimensions they may or may
not coordinate). Such an association may or may not function as a
classic price-fixing cartel. A "hard core" cartel has the goal of price
fixing and/or market allocation.7 An "export cartel" may have the
identical primary goal, or it might have strictly efficiency enhancing
goals; or it may do both. For example, the firms in the association
may simply be sharing the fixed costs of marketing or
transportation.8 Still, it is their self-selection in obtaining exemptions
from antitrust laws regulating "hard core cartel" activities that sets
these associations apart. We will use both terms, referring to "export
associations" when speaking about a legal designation and "export
cartels" when discussing the policy issues more generally.
an argument for retaining beggar-thy-neighbour legal provisions such as
exemptions from national competition laws for export cartels.").
6. Export cartels can be "mixed," meaning that they have both domestic and
foreign effects. Alternatively, export cartels 'can be classified as "national" in
membership (domestic firms only) or "international" in membership. The pure
export cartels discussed here are usually national, but some countries, including the
United States, permit foreign firms to join export associations and receive antitrust
exemptions, as long as their effects are strictly outside the country in question.
7. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc.
C(98)35/FINAL, 3 (1998) (using the terminology "hard core cartels" to refer to
private cooperative agreements to set prices or allocate markets).
8. See Andrew R. Dick, Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or
Monopoly-Promoting?: Evidence from the Webb-Pomerene Experience, 15 RES. L.
& ECON. 89, 90-91 (1992).
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief overview
of the motivations for export cartel exemptions. We then turn in
Section II to the current policy debate about these exemptions and
discuss the positions of different countries with respect to continued
exemptions. Section III gives a detailed discussion of the types of
export cartel exemptions and the changing status of these exemptions
around the world. We survey the antitrust laws in fifty-five countries,
report on how they currently treat export cartels, and examine
whether and why their policies have changed over the past decade.
The conclusion draws on this analysis to offer relevant policy
recommendations.
I. MOTIVATION FOR EXPORT CARTEL
EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR PREVALENCE
A. MOTIVATION
As the country with the strongest and longest standing antitrust
laws, the United States also adopted the earliest "export exemption"
to its antitrust laws in 1918. 9 At the time, Congress was primarily
concerned with two factors that might inhibit exports: (1) the
inability of U.S. firms to work together in representing their own
interests vis-d-vis powerful foreign cartels, and (2) the high fixed
costs of exporting, which would be particularly burdensome to small
firms.1" Although there was a great deal of controversy about such
legislation (in particular, there were concerns that the firms in these
export associations would coordinate to increase domestic prices),
the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act ("WPA" or "Webb-
Pomerene")II passed and remains in effect today. 2
9. See Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000).
10. See David A. Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13
J.L. & ECON. 461,462-63 (1970); see also 15 U.S.C. § 400 1(a) (2000).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000). Firms must register with the Federal Trade
Commission to form a Webb-Pomerene association.
12. See STAFF REP. TO THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW 1-7 (1967) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REP.],
for an assessment of the WPA.
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Over sixty years later, with U.S. firms facing increased
competition in global markets, Congress expanded upon the antitrust
exemptions provided in the WPA when it passed the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982 ("ETC Act"). 3 The ETC Act does not
supersede the Webb-Pomerene Act, and at the time of passage of the
ETC Act there were thirty-nine registered Webb-Pomerene
associations in existence. 4 Congress was motivated, in part, by both
the growing U.S. trade deficit and the perceived restrictiveness of
U.S. antitrust policies on the ability of U.S. firms to compete
abroad. 5 Congress intended that the ETC Act would "increase
United States exports of products and services by encouraging more
efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers
and suppliers .... According to Spencer Weber Waller, Congress
anticipated that the ETC Act would:
1) encourage the formation of well financed vertically integrated general
trading companies along the line of Japanese general trading companies
("sogoshosas") to assist United States exporters with all aspects of the
exporting process; 2) allow competitors to jointly exploit market power
abroad to offset the power of private cartels and foreign government
enterprises; and 3) unleash a wave of export activity by small and medium
sized firms previously restrained by uncertainty over the application of U.S.
antitrust laws. '
7
13. Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4011-4021 (2000);
see Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 243-45
(summarizing the features of the ETC Act, compared to the Webb-Pomerene Act);
see also James V. Lacy, The Effect of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 on
U.S. Export Trade, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177, 185 (1987). The United States has
also granted export trading certificates ("ETCs") to a handful of Webb-Pomerene
associations, such as the California Dried Fruit Export Trading Co. and Northwest
Fruit Exporters, although the member firms are not always identical. Id.
14. See Victor, supra note 1, at 573. The number of Webb-Pomerene
associations has declined slowly through the years. Currently, only six Webb-
Pomerene associations are registered with the Federal Trade Commission. See Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Export Trade Associations Registered Pursuant to the Webb-
Pomerene Act (May 5, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 WPA Registration], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/webbpomerene/list030505.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2005).
15. See Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 239-40.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 400 1(b).
17. Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 240.
[20:785
EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
After World War II, other countries around the world adopted
stronger provisions against domestic price-fixing; the number of
countries with provisions for antitrust exemptions for export
activities also increased. For example, Germany's 1958 antitrust law,
recently amended,"8 required pure export cartels to go through a
notification process, but it exempted them from scrutiny and
prosecution "provided they are intended to strengthen the
competitive position of the domestic member firms vis-d-vis their
foreign competitors."' 9
Australia also adopted (and maintains) an explicit exemption with
notification. Australia's law recognizes that firms might want to
collaborate in order to promote or facilitate exports, but it is
concerned about potential harm to domestic consumers: "Most
nations exempt export agreements or export associations from
competition regulation, and Australia is no exception. Some
countries (including the United States and Australia) are, however,
concerned that competition-reducing spillover effects be avoided in
domestic markets, and require some sort of registration and
disclosure of the arrangement."2 Australia's guidelines justify these
exemptions by noting that, "[w]hile size may not be necessary to
enhance export opportunities, correct and complete market
information is crucial."2 For example, the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission ("ACCC") is "open to arguments that an
export consortium has been structured in a way such that domestic
competition will not be substantially lessened, so that coordination of
supply to overseas markets and information exchanged in an export
18. See generally infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing the
evolution of Germany's competition law).
19. Victor, supra note 1, at 576.
20. ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. Coop., EXPORTS AND THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT:
GUIDELINES TO THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND
OTHER COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS THAT AIM TO ENHANCE EXPORTS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY § 3 (1997)
[hereinafter EXPORTS AND THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Australia/Decision/audeclc.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2005).
21. Id. § 4, available at
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Australia/Decision/audecld.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2005).
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consortium is quarantined from activities undertaken on the domestic
market. 22
There is pressure to enact antitrust exemptions only where there
are strong antitrust laws. Advocates of these exemptions rely on two
types of arguments. First, they fall back on Mercantilist arguments
supporting policies that are intended to increase exports and improve
the trade balance, even at the expense of domestic consumers and
trade partners. 23  For example, Israel's existing antitrust law
specifically provides for an exemption for transactions that improve
the balance of payments of the state. 4 Second, they argue that these
exemptions level the playing field for small firms that would
otherwise be disadvantaged in overcoming the hurdles of entering
international markets. 5
B. PREVALENCE OF EXPORT CARTELS
A few numbers can help to put the export cartel exemptions debate
in perspective. The best data come from the United States, which
requires registration and publishes announcements of its certification
of exemptions. Table 1 presents the U.S. data, along with intermittent
data from selected other countries. Immediately after passage of the
ETC Act, many export trade associations applied for certificates;
however, the number of applications leveled out in the mid-1990s.
As of 2003, there were 153 valid U.S. export trade certificates.
Among the explanations for the modest response by firms to the ETC
Act are:
[T]he dramatic appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies in the
1980s, the widening trade deficit, the fear of disclosure of confidential
business information to the government in order to receive certification,
22. See id. § 3 (noting that the ACCC distinguishes "export agreements" and
"export consortia"). "Agreements" relate to pricing, while "consortia" relate to
product development and marketing strategies for export operations. Id.
23. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 607-26 (1937), provides the classic argument against Mercantile
policies that favor exporters, the creation of a trade surplus, and the accumulation
of domestic gold stocks at the expense of consumer welfare.
24. See infra note 61 and surrounding text.
25. See generally Dick, supra note 8, at 90-95.
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and the lack of a definitive precedent interpreting the scope of the
protection provided by antitrust certification.
26
As discussed above, Australia, like the United States, has an
explicit exemption along with a notification requirement. The ACCC
can authorize an exemption if it feels there is a potential benefit that
outweighs the potential harm. 7 Consistent with the U.S. trend, the
annual Australian "authorizations" for export cartels have declined
from a peak of sixty-nine in 1975 to just four in 2002. As of 1997,
the ACCC reported that "over the years" it had received
approximately 400 export agreement notifications.28 The story is
similar in Japan, where Table 1 shows that exemptions in force
declined from 180 in 1973 to two in 1998 and zero in 1999. Germany
shows a similar pattern in annual exemptions: 227 in 1972 to thirty-
six in 1999.
These data provide, at best, only a partial answer to the question of
how many export cartel exemptions antitrust authorities issue
annually around the world. The available data suggest that such
exemptions are still used, but that their number is rapidly declining.
Since most countries do not require registration or notification, there
is no way to measure whether the use of export associations
themselves is declining, or whether they are still prevalent in
countries where registration is not required.
II. THE POLICY DEBATE
A. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
A growing number of policymakers argue that countries should
abandon export cartel exemptions and replace them with cooperative,
international antitrust enforcement.2 9 There are four types of
26. Walter, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 246.
27. See generally EXPORTS AND THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT GUIDELINES,
supra note 20, § 3.
28. See generally id. (noting that the ACCC analyzes export consortium
proposals on a case-by-case basis).
29. See World Trade Org., Rep. of the Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy - Communication from the European
Community and its Member States: A WTO Competition Agreement's Contribution
7932005]
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arguments in favor of harmonization and cooperation. The first can
be thought of as a defense of positive comity. As articulated in 1996
by Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miret, and repeated many times
since, export cartel exemptions are especially problematic because
they prevent those with the most information about the activities of
export cartels from helping those who might be harmed by them.3°
A second argument against exemptions stems from the concern
that the intended beneficiaries are not those using these exemptions.
It has frequently been argued that large international companies, not
small and medium-sized ones, are taking advantage of export cartel
exemptions, thus defeating the purpose of the exemptions.31 At a
2003 meeting of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") Working
Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, the
Thai representative acknowledged that export cartels "could
sometimes be pro-competitive or have efficiency-enhancing effects,".
but argued that these associations "should not benefit from a blanket
to International Cooperation and Technical Assistance for Capacity Building,
WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/W/184, 4 (May 8, 2003)
(A competition agreement should include provisions to facilitate voluntary
case-specific cooperation in relation to anti-competitive practices having an
impact on international trade. Such provisions should apply to . .. anti-
competitive practices . . .with an impact on the trade flows to and from a
different geographical market than that in which the practices have been
conceived (e.g., export cartels, abuse of a dominant position by a foreign
corporation).).
30. See Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules,
Communication, Submitted by Sir Leon Brittan & Karel Van Miert to the Council,
COM(96)284 § 1(b), Annex § (b) (1996) (discussing export cartels and
informational requirements for prosecution), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/intemational/com284.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005). For a general discussion of positive comity, see id. Annex § (c). The
WTO representative of Switzerland argued that "[w]ith regard to export cartels....
the countries that would be competent to pursue these cartels, namely those in
whose markets the cartels operated, often lacked the necessary tools and
information since the participating firms were located abroad." World Trade Org.,
Rep. on the Meeting of 20-21 Feb. 2003, WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/M/21, 16 (May
26, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Feb. Rep.]. "These considerations were important for
small countries that had not the ability to get information from firms with main
offices abroad." Id.
31. See World Trade Org., Rep. of the Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc.
WT/WGTCP/7, 14 (July 17, 2003).
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exemption from competition laws, which would exclude them even
from scrutiny under a rule of reason (case-by-case) approach."32 Her
concern was motivated by evidence suggesting that most export
cartels involved multinational companies, and therefore, the
efficiency argument was suspect.
33
This claim that the majority of export cartels were made up of
relatively large firms had validity in the 1950s and 1960s. A 1967
study of Webb-Pomerene associations found that "[m]ost
associations are [made up of] medium to large-sized firms with
assets greater than $10 million. ' 34 Three years later, a study by
Larson found that between 1958 and 1962, almost seventy percent of
Webb-Pomerene associations were composed of firms with assets of
greater than $1 million.35 Only seventy-five of the 455 firms in the
sample were classified as "small," and fifty-three of these firms
exported agricultural goods.36 Furthermore, none of the "small firm"
associations functioned as a single sales agency: "Thus, scale
economies and cartel protection are irrelevant for this group.1
37
It is not clear that this characterization continues to hold. In his
study of ETCs, Waller finds that "[tjhe ETC program has been used
almost exclusively by small export intermediaries and by trade
associations focusing on a small group of products, industries, or
markets. '38 Waller also argues that the number of certificates of
32. WTO Feb. Rep., supra note 30, at 17.
33. See World Trade Org., Rep. on the Meeting of 26-27 Sept. 2002, WTO Doc.
WT/WGTCP/MI19, 6 (Nov. 15, 2002) (hereinafter WTO Sept. Rep.] (reporting that
the Thai representative claimed that "a vast number of studies had shown that most
such cartels involved large companies and that there was little or no efficiency
justification for their practices").
34. See FTC STAFF REP., supra note 12, at 44.
35. See David A. Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13
J.L. & ECON. 461, 470 (1970) (noting that only sixteen percent of the firms were
small firms that all belonged to the same fifteen associations, leaving thirty-two
associations with no small firm members).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 472.
38. Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 250; see also
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 9:23,
at 9-64 (3d ed., Dec. 2004) [hereinafter WALLER, BUSINESS ABROAD]. Other
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review issued by the Commerce Department has been small and
declining. 9 There is precious little empirical work on the current
composition of export cartels for the primary reason that government
agencies either do not collect data on them or keep that data
confidential. In general, even the data for countries that require
notification "can be deceiving given the fact that there may be no
requirement of compulsory notification when export agreements are
abandoned and no requirements for reporting cartels or agreements
which do not include any restrictions on domestic commerce."40
Even when countries do report data on exemptions, they often
aggregate it with data on other types of exemptions, making it
impossible to disentangle information specifically about export
cartels. Waller's analysis suggests that U.S. export cartels are no
longer dominated by large multinational companies, or at least that a
substantial number of ETCs are made up of relatively small firms. Of
course, this conclusion only relates to the United States and cannot
extend to other countries without further study.
The third argument against exemptions reflects concern about the
effects of these laws, and elimination of these laws, on developing
countries. At recent WTO meetings, developing country delegates
articulated support for the elimination of export cartel exemptions in
industrialized countries, while preserving this option for developing
countries. At a 2002 meeting, Thailand argued that most export
cartels damage the economies of developing countries and should be
illegal; but developing countries should be exempt, since small
exporters might need to join forces to increase bargaining power.
One year later, WTO representatives from Egypt and China made the
same point, citing the need to pool resources as necessary to promote
international trade.42
authors have drawn similar conclusions. See William Nye, An Economic Profile of
Export Trading Companies, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 309, 323 (1993) (finding that
over forty percent of all ETCs at the time had total exports less than $50,000).
39. WALLER, BUSINESSS ABROAD, supra note 38, § 9:24, at 9-66-9-67 ("The
Department of Commerce has issued only 182 certificates of review through June
30, 2001. Of these, a number have been relinquished, revoked, or have expired.").
40. Waller, U.S. Antitrust Ambivalence, supra note 2, at 110.
41. See WTO Sept. Rep., supra note 33, at 6.
42. See World Trade Org., Rep. on the Meeting of 26-27 May 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/WGTCP/M/22, 11 (July 9, 2003) [hereinafter WTO May Rep.] (reporting that
796 [20:785
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Fourth, export exemptions undermine international trade policies
that promote greater market integration and freer international trade.
The Canadian Bar Association commented in a 2003 submission
concerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"):
With respect to export cartels, the CBA Section has difficulty seeing how
Canada, the U.S. or other jurisdictions could seek to preserve export cartel
exemptions in the context of an FTAA with a meaningful competition
policy component. The fact that this was not addressed in Chapter 15 of
[the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")] is one of many
reasons why more vigorous provisions on export cartels need to be
explored.43
The United States declined to repeal the WPA and ETC Act when
asked to do so by trading partners in the mid-1990s.4 Mexico
specifically asked that these U.S. provisions be repealed, but the
United States rejected this request. In fact, the final version of
NAFTA specifically preserves these "safe havens" from U.S.
antitrust law:
No changes in U.S. antitrust laws, including the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982 or the Webb-Pomerene Act, will be required to implement
U.S. obligations under the NAFTA. These laws have contributed to the
the Egyptian representative said that "it was necessary to leave to [developing
nations] the right to assist their local firms either directly, for example by granting
them subsidies, or indirectly by allowing for mergers, acquisitions, export cartels,
resource pooling or otherwise as each country deemed appropriate for its policy
objectives"). At this same meeting, China stated it "shared the view that had been
expressed by Thailand that the future multilateral framework on competition policy
should incorporate restrictions on the maintenance of export cartels by developed
country Members." Id. at 15. See generally Nareerat Wiriyapong, Easing of
Competition Law Urged, THE NATION (THAILAND), Aug. 31, 1999 (reporting that
academics "urged the government to relax the implementation of the Competition
Law for export cartels in order to strengthen competitiveness of Thai exporters in
international markets").
43. CANADIAN B. Ass'N NAT'L COMPETITION L. SEC., SUBMISSION
CONCERNING THE FTAA COMPETITION 2 (Apr. 2003).
44. See COALITION FOR OPEN TRADE, ADDRESSING PRIVATE RESTRAINTS OF
TRADE: INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENTS SEARCH FOR ANSWERS REGARDING
TRADE-AND-COMPETITION POLICY 18 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter COALITION TRADE
POL'Y SEARCH] (noting the importance of U.S. safe harbor policy given the
potential damage awards offered under U.S. law), available at
http://www.dbtrade.com/licit/licit.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
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export competitiveness of U.S. industries and they remain appropriate in
the context of a free trade area. Nothing in the Agreement requires any
NAFTA government to take measures that would adversely affect such
associations.
45
B. THE POLICY RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES
In the context of this growing criticism of export exemptions, and
in an effort to eliminate trade frictions and encourage competition
within the European Union ("EU"), the European Commission and
many EU member states have eliminated explicit exemptions for
export activity. In contrast, the United States has been one of the
leading defenders of export cartel exemptions. However, these
criticisms appear to have effected the promotion of export
exemptions by U.S. officials. The United States' joint FTC/DOJ
International Antitrust Guidelines changed between 1988 and 1995
to reflect the U.S. shift in policy toward more aggressive
enforcement of antitrust laws against international cartels.
Presumably reflecting the tension between the European position and
the unchanged U.S. law allowing export cartels, the new guidelines
give the exemptions a lower profile in its characterization of U.S.
international antitrust policy.46
45. Id. (quoting The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, NAFTA Administrative Action Statement, ch. 15(B) (Sept. 3, 1993)).
46. Prominently featured in the first paragraph under "Enforcement Policy" in
the 1988 Guidelines, the U.S. Department of Justice states that it "is not concerned
with conduct that solely affects competition in foreign markets and could have no
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on competition and consumers
in the United States." Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed.
Reg. 21584, 21586 (1988). In the 1995 revision, the first paragraph under the new
Section 3, "Threshold International Enforcement Issues," states:
Just as the acts of U.S. citizens in a foreign nation ordinarily are subject to the
law of the country in which they occur, the acts of foreign citizens in the
United States are subject to U.S. law. The reach of the U.S. antitrust laws is
not limited, however, to conduct and transactions that occur within the
boundaries of the United States. Anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S.
domestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless
of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties involved.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.1 (April 1995) [hereinafter
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
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Despite all of the criticisms, the United States continues to defend
the WPA and the ETC Act. At a 2003 WTO meeting, the United
States argued:
[T]hese arrangements typically were conceived as mechanisms for
domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in effective export
activity acting individually. As such, they often had pro-competitive
effects in that they added another player to the relevant markets and might
bring innovation or lower prices. Moreover, they were not secret and
therefore did not bear the hallmarks of what was traditionally considered
to be a hardcore cartel.47
The U.S. position does reflect what little is known about the
effects of current U.S. export exemptions on competition in world
markets. Spencer Weber Waller's survey of the activities of ETCs
concludes that most function as export intermediaries and service
providers, not as horizontal agreements between competitors. 8 While
recognizing the limited overall positive impact of these ETCs, Waller
discounts the threat to competition posed by export exemptions:
The ETC Act does not create market power, nor does it create or maintain
barriers to entry. It merely permits an industry, as a matter of U.S. law, to
collusively exploit such market power abroad if it already exists. The
history of the Webb-Pomerene Act suggests that few export associations
will have sufficient global market power to exploit foreign markets.
49
In 1992, Andrew Dick came to a similar conclusion from his
analysis of the Webb-Pomerene experience.50  Global policy
discussions and revisions, however, have continued despite limited
2005). The "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" wording of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 can still be found in the
guidelines, but it is placed instead at the end of the same paragraph. Id.
47. WTO Feb. Rep., supra note 30, at 15.
48. See Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 251-52.
49. Id. at 251.
50. See Dick, supra note 8, at 104 (noting that, from a sample of sixteen Webb-
Pomerene Associations, cartel operation raised export volumes by an average of
15.0% and lowered prices an average of 7.6%). Only two industries in the sample
produced evidence that the Webb-Pomerene Associations had anti-competitive
effects. Id. at 110.
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knowledge of the impact of export cartels based in the United States'
or elsewhere.
III. STATUS OF EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
A. CURRENT STATUS
This section examines the current status of the law on export cartel
exemptions for fifty-five countries, including the existence of
reporting requirements (Table 2). This sample consists of all OECD
countries, EU countries, and selected developing countries. An
asterisk in Table 2 indicates a developing country."
We classify the legal treatment of export cartels into three groups:
explicit exemptions, implicit exemptions and no statutory exemption.
Explicit exemptions are created when a statute explicitly excludes
export cartels from the substantive provisions regarding the scope of
the antitrust law. Of the countries covered in Table 2, seventeen have
explicit exemptions. There are two types of explicit exemptions:
those that require notification or authorization procedures, and those
that do not. The notification procedures generally require businesses
to apply for, and receive, pernission from the government before, or
concurrent with, participating in practices that may otherwise violate
domestic antitrust law. Of the seventeen countries with explicit
exemptions, six require notification.
Canadian competition law provides a good example of an explicit
exemption without a notification requirement.52 Under Canada's
statutory scheme, combinations relating solely to the export of
products from Canada are exempt from antitrust liability. However,
Canadian exporters can lose their exemption if "the arrangement has
resulted in or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation of the real
51. The categorization of developing countries is taken from the World Bank.
See World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Country Groups (classifying
developing countries into groups based on region, income, and indebtedness),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2005). The classification by income splits developing countries into
three groups: low income (e.g., Armenia, India, Vietnam), lower-middle income
(e.g., Albania, China, Thailand), and upper-middle income (e.g., Argentina, Czech
Republic, Saudi Arabia). Id.
52. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45(5) (1985) (Can.) (stating that
export activity is exempt from conviction under the Competition Act).
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value of exports of a product."53 Since there is no notification
requirement, it is impossible to measure how many exporters have
taken advantage of this exemption from antitrust liability. This is
also the case in Iceland, where the law provides an explicit
exemption without a notification requirement.54 Iceland's legislature
passed the law in 1993 and amended it several times since then, so its
provisions are not simply a vestige of historical practice.55
By contrast, Australia, like the United States, offers an explicit
exemption for export cartels, but requires that firms satisfy a
notification requirement to receive immunity.56 This exemption
protects "any provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding
that relates exclusively to the export of goods from Australia, or to
the supply of services outside Australia provided that particulars [of
the agreement] are submitted to the [ACCC] within 14 days of the
contract, arrangement or understanding being arrived at."57
Australian competition law therefore provides for automatic
immunity for export transactions on a transaction-by-transaction
basis.58 The ACCC explicitly excludes from exemption any
agreement that relates to supply or pricing in the domestic market. 9
Between 1974 and 2004, the ACCC received approximately 234
notifications.6"
53. Id. § 45(6a).
54. See Competition Law, No. 8, art. 3 (1993) (Ice.) (mandating that the
Competition Law does not apply to exports by stating: "[t]his Law shall not apply
to agreements, terms or actions which are solely intended to have an effect outside
of Iceland"), available at http://www.samkeppni.is (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
55. See id. (noting that the law was amended in 1994, 1997, 1998, and 2000).
56. See Trade Practices Act, No. 51, §§ 6-7 (1974) (Austl.) (stating that
Australian exporters seeking an exemption from antitrust liability must first notify
the government under the requirements detailed in section 51 (2)(g) of the Trade
Practices Act of 1974).
57. See EXPORTS AND THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT GUIDELINES, supra note 20,
at 33.
58. See Trade Practices Act, § 5 l(2)(g).
59. See EXPORTS AND THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT GUIDELINES, supra note 20,
at 34.
60. See E-mail from Jaime Norton, Adjudication Branch, Australian
Competition and Consumer Comm'n (June 2003) (noting that section 51(2)(g)
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Israel also has a reporting requirement, but with somewhat
different criteria for issuing an exemption. Under its policy, engaging
in export is a factor for consideration in applying for antitrust
exemption, not a separate category of exemption.61 When reviewing
applications for exemptions, Israel's Antitrust Tribunal considers
matters of public interest, which include "[i]mproving the balance of
payments of the State by reducing imports or reducing the price of
imports or by increasing exports and their feasibility. 62
Two of the countries whose laws provide for explicit exemptions
with a reporting requirement apparently do not actually have any
such exemptions in effect, at least at the present time. South Africa's
1998 competition law includes an explicit exemption with
notification, 63 but the Competition Commission has yet to grant any
export exemptions. Taiwan's 2000 law also permits firms to apply
for an exemption from its ban on concerted actions,' but as of July
2004, no such exemptions were in effect.65
Finally, United States antitrust law offers a wide-reaching
exemption to businesses engaged in export. In 1982, the United
States clarified the jurisdiction of its antitrust laws, amending the
export agreements are not considered "authorizations," and therefore Australia's
annual report statistics do not include them) (on file with author).
61. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law, No. 5748, §§ 7-10 (1988) (Isr.),
available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il/Antitrust/en-
US/LawandRegulations/RestrictiveTradePracticesLaw.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2005).
62. Id. § 10 (listing quality and supply of goods, promotion of competition,
prevention of harm to important industries, and job creation as other equally
important factors for consideration when reviewing a restrictive agreement).
63. See § 10 of Competition Act of 1998 (S. Afr.) (permitting the Competition
Commission to exempt certain agreements that contribute to the "maintenance or
promotion of exports," as well as other considerations, such as economic stability
and enhancing the competitiveness of small businesses), available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/TheNewAct.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
64. See Fair Trade Act, § 14(4) (2000) (Taiwan) (providing that enterprises can
enter into concerted action agreements so long as they affect only foreign markets),
available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/indexEnglish.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
65. See Fed. Trade Comm'n (Taiwan), Statistics: Applications for Concerted
Action Approval: Cases Received (giving a list of exempted enterprises and the
type of exemption), available at
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/200001012999123180l.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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Sherman Act66 to make clear that it applies only to actions that harm
the domestic market.67 In doing so, the United States provided an
implicit exemption, similar to those discussed below, for firms that
engage in collusive conduct solely affecting the export market. Then
Congress went further, creating a new explicit exemption. Under the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, an exporter, group of
exporters, or export intermediary can apply for a certificate of review
stating that its export trade activity does not violate U.S. antitrust
laws before they engage in cooperative activity directed at the export
market.68
The ETC Act includes provisions for written antitrust pre-
clearance. The Department of Justice reviews each request for an
"export trade certificate of review" before the Department of
Commerce can grant such a certificate.69 Issuance of an ETC
certificate essentially eliminates the threat of governmental
prosecution for antitrust violations. It shifts the burden of proof in
any civil litigation to the litigant/accuser and limits any awards to
single, rather than treble, damages in private antitrust actions. 70 The
ETC Act also expanded the scope of U.S. exemptions beyond that
provided in the WPA. It allows antitrust protection for export of
services (rather than goods only), allows any person, partnership, or
association to apply for a certificate of review (rather than
associations only), and allows banks to participate in and to acquire
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
67. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a),
45(a)(3) (2000) (exempting export commerce that does not have a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" in the United States from the
Sherman Act and FTC Act); see also F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
124 S. Ct. 2359, 2361 (2004) (holding that when the foreign effects of price-fixing
are independent of any adverse domestic effect, neither the FTAIA nor the
Sherman Act apply, and a claim cannot be sustained).
68. See Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4016 (2000).
69. See, e.g., id. § 4013(a) (specifying the conditions for granting an export
trade certificate of review). There cannot be "a substantial lessening of competition
or restraint of trade within the United States" and the association cannot "constitute
unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the export of goods.
.Id.
70. See Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 245
(outlining the antitrust certificate provisions of the ETC Act).
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shares in an export trading company.7" The ETC Act also differs
from the WPA by establishing an office within the Department of
Commerce both to oversee the granting of ETC certificates, and to
promote the formation of export trading companies in the United
States.72 It is important to note that the ETC Act does not protect
American export cartels from prosecution by other countries. 73 Firms
are only eligible for an ETC exemption if their actions will have no
effect on the domestic market. The cooperative activity must not
harm domestic competition or create unfair competition for domestic
competitors.74 The ETC Act offers other benefits to certificate
holders in civil litigation, including a shorter statute of limitations,
presumption that certified conduct is lawful, and attorney's fees and
costs for the prevailing party.7 Between 1983 and 2003, the
Department of Commerce issued 191 certificates, 153 of which were
still valid in 2003.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b).
72. See id. §§ 4003, 4011.
73. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 46, § 2.7 (reporting that an export
trade certificate issued under the ETC Act "does not constitute, explicitly or
implicitly, an endorsement or opinion by the Secretary of Commerce or by the
Attorney General concerning the legality of such business plans under the laws of
any foreign country"). There have been two important cases in this regard. The
first was the 1988 Wood Pulp decision by the European Court of Justice. See
Victor, supra note 1, at 574 (providing a brief overview of the Wood Pulp case);
see also Aditya Bhattacharjea, Export Cartels: A Developing Country Perspective,
38 J. WORLD TRADE 331, 341 (2004) (explaining that the 1988 Wood Pulp
decision by the European Court of Justice rejected the American companies'
defense that they had immunity via their WP association and asserted that Webb-
Pomerene associations were optional, not required, and thus, the principle of state
non-interference did not hold). Bhattacharjea focuses on an analysis of the second
relevant case, or more properly, global series of cases, involving the American
Natural Soda Ash Corporation ("ANSAC"), a Webb-Pomerene association formed
in 1983. Bhattacharjea analyzes ANSAC's legal battles with antitrust authorities in
the European Union, India, South Africa, and Venezuela. Id. at 340-47. Despite
initial failure, ANSAC's reformulation as the American-European Soda Ash
Shipping Association ("AESASA") satisfied the European Commission's
exemption requirements, but ANSAC continued to have problems in other
countries and was unsuccessful in convincing any competition authority that the
efficiency benefits of the association outweighed the potential for exercising
market power. Id.
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a).
75. See Waller, The Failure of the ETC Program, supra note 2, at 245.
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An implicit exemption for export cartels exists when a national
antitrust statute applies only to anticompetitive conduct affecting the
domestic market.76 Most countries in our sample (64%), including
almost all members of the EU, have implicit exemptions. Such an
exemption is granted by negative implication, since the scope of the
antitrust law is limited, and does not explicitly mention behavior
affecting foreign markets.
Ireland's competition law provides a typical example of an
implicit exemption for export cartels." The Irish Competition Act of
2002 prohibits agreements that restrict or distort competition within
the State of Ireland.78 Specifically, the Competition Act of 2002,
Section 4(1), provides: "[A]ll agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition in trade in any goods or services in the
State or in any part of the State are prohibited and void ... ."79 The
Act does not refer to agreements that restrict or distort competition in
other countries.
In some countries, there is no statutory exemption. This occurs
when price fixing is illegal, and there is not an implicit exemption,
because the antitrust statute simply does not define the geographic
scope of the market, nor is there an explicit exemption allowing price
fixing for export-oriented activity. This category includes
Luxembourg, Russia, Thailand, and Uruguay. For example,
Luxembourg's "Loi du 17 mai relative a la concurrence" prohibits
cartels and other activities that limit competition "sur le march," but
76. See Simon Evenett, Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, International
Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, 24 WORLD ECON. 1221, 1230-31
(2001) (making a similar distinction between explicit and implicit exemptions); see
also Bhattacharjea, supra note 73, at 336 ("Conduct relating to exports is excluded
from the coverage of the national law, either explicitly, or implicitly by jurisdiction
being limited to activities that affect competition in the domestic market.").
77. See Competition Act, No. 14, § 4(1) (2002) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZA14Y2002S4.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
78. See id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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it does not explicitly delimit any legal, economic, or geographic
boundaries of"le march '."'8
In summary, of the fifty-five countries surveyed, thirty-four have
implicit exemptions, seventeen have explicit exemptions, and four
have no statutory exemptions. A little over one-third of those
countries with explicit exemptions also have a notification
requirement.8'
B. RECENT CHANGES IN EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there is both a lack of
consistency across countries in how export cartels are treated and a
lack of information on who has received exemptions and what kinds
of activities they have engaged in. There does seem to be one clear
trend, however, namely the elimination of explicit exemptions.
Several countries have recently amended their competition laws to
eliminate explicit export cartel exemptions. The countries instituting
such changes are Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom ("UK").
Table 3 provides the dates of these reforms, as well as the form of
the exemption policy change for each country. We discuss each
country in turn.
One important force behind this trend is the push for convergence
in competition policies across the member states of the EU. This is
clearly seen in the recent modifications adopted by Cyprus and
Hungary, which became members of the EU as of May 1, 2004.2
80. See Law No. 76 of 2004, c. 1 (Lux.). "Sur le march" means "in the
market" in the context of this statute.
81. Cf Waller, U.S. Antitrust Ambivalence, supra note 2, at 109-10 (noting that
in 1989, only four OECD countries - Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
the United States - had mechanisms for registering export agreements). Thus, the
changes in the antitrust policies of Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
only recent.
82. See European Union, The Member States of the European Union: Cyprus,
available at
http://europa.eu.intlabc/european-countries/eumembers/cyprus/indexen.htm
(last visited May 22, 2005); European Union, The Member States of the European
Union: Hungary, available at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/european-countries/eumembers/hungary/indexen.htm
(last visited May 22, 2005).
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Many of these countries had explicit exemptions in the past, but have
changed their laws to parallel the EU's legislative framework.
Similarly, Turkey, which had no competition law before 1994, and
therefore no exemption for export cartels, has adopted a law that
contains the same implicit exemption now common across EU
countries.83
The evolution of Germany's competition law is prototypical for
European countries. Before a 1999 Amendment, the Act Against
Restraints of Competition ("GWB") 84 allowed pure export cartel
exemptions after the satisfaction of a notification requirement.85
Between the original 1958 Act and the 1999 amendment, 130
exporters received an exemption under Germany's notification
procedure.86 In 1999, Germany amended the GWB to repeal the
explicit exemption for pure export cartels. 87 Elaborating on the 1999
83. See Act on the Protection of Competition, No. 4054, art. 2 (Turk.) (stating
that agreements which restrict competition "between any undertakings operating in
or affecting markets for goods and services with the boundaries of the Republic of
Turkey fall under this Act"), available at
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/word/ekanun.doc (last visited May 21, 2005).
84. (1958) (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GWB.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
85. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., EXPORT CARTELS: REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSfNESS PRACTICES, 5-12
(1974) [hereinafter OECD EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT] (providing a detailed
interpretation of export cartel exemptions under German antitrust law).
It is not expressly stated in the law that cartels relating solely to German
exports are covered by the general prohibition of cartels (Section 1 of the Act
against Restraint of Competition) . . . [but] the Federal Cartel Office
[considered that] "pure" export cartels relating to German exports are cartels
within the scope of Section 1 . . . [although] pure export cartels having no
[domestic] effects do not fall in principle within the scope of Section 1 and
thus do not have to be notified under Section 9(2) . . . [and that the]
exemption for "pure" export cartels ... merely requires that the cartel serves
"the protection and promotion of exports."
Id. 5,7.
86. See Joachim Schwalbach & Anja Schwerk, Stability of German Cartels, in
COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY, AND WELFARE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MANFRED
NEUMANN 101-28 (Dennis C. Mueller et al., eds., 1999) (arguing that Germany
amended its competition law five times since coming into force in 1958, with each
subsequent amendment bringing further liberalization).
87. See id. at 105.
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amendment, commentators note: "[t]he prohibition of concerted
practices, found in § 25 of the old version of the GWB (o.v.), has
been incorporated in § 1 in order to follow the wording of Art. 85(1)
EEC Treaty. . . . [T]he exemptions for rebate cartels . . .export
cartels . . . and import cartels ... have been repealed. 8 8 Legislative
comments made during the passage of the 1999 amendments indicate
that the export cartel exemption was repealed "due to worldwide
efforts to combat cross-border restraints on competition."8 9
Similarly, the UK's Competition Act of 1998 eliminated its
explicit export cartel exemptions.9° Until 1998, the UK permitted
export cartels following notification to the Director General of Fair
Trading.91 The exemption was eliminated as part of a general
updating of the competition law.9z This change was maintained in the
2002 Enterprise Act, which criminalized hard core cartels affecting
the UK market. 93 The primary objective of the 1998 law was to bring
the UK's cartel laws in line with those of the EU.
88. Joachim Rudo, The 1999 Amendments to the German Act Against
Restraints of Competition (highlighting the 1999 Amendments as an effort to
further promote harmony with EU competition law), at
http://www.rudo.de/new/mainga_commentsonthe.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
Germany has not repealed all exemptions. Id. Other categories of exemptions
remain, such as agreements for uniform application of standards or types,
specialization cartels, structural crisis, or recession cartels. Id.
89. See id. (describing the abolition of the "long-arm" statute of the Act and its
notification requirement).
90. See Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, §§ 1-3 (Eng.).
91. See David Parker, The Competition Act of 1998: Change and Continuity in
U.K. Competition Policy, J. Bus. L., July 2000, at 290 ("Under the 1956 Restrictive
Trade Practices Act ... cartel agreements were not prohibited, they were simply
'registrable'. Once an agreement was registered the DGFT [Director General of
Fair Trading] was required to bring the agreement before the Restrictive Practices
Court.").
92. See id. The 1998 Competition Act replaces the need for registration with a
general prohibition. Chapter I of the Act sets out the prohibition against
agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which "may affect trade
within the United Kingdom" and "have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the United Kingdom" (Section 2(1)).
Id.
93. Enterprise Act, c. 40, §§ 188, 190 (2002) (Eng.) (stating that an individual
is guilty of a cartel offense if prices are fixed "in the United Kingdom" and that, if
convicted on indictment, an individual is liable "to imprisonment for a term not
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Several additional factors explain the 1998 changes. One such
factor was the existence of an "extreme number of [cartel]
exemptions" under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1973.94
Practical enforcement of cartel prohibitions was virtually impossible
under such a complicated framework of exemptions. 95 The British
government recognized this problem in a Green Paper published in
1988.96 There was also concern that the UK's former law was
oriented towards the registration of anti-competitive cartels rather
than the prevention of such cartels, that the prior laws did not provide
for any meaningful methods of enforcement-such as retroactive
penalties-and, finally, that the prior UK law did not require
registration of an export cartel if only one company in the cartel
agreed to restrict its conduct.97
Competition law in the Netherlands and Sweden has also changed.
As with several other countries mentioned above (e.g., Cyprus),
these changes were driven by the desire for European convergence.
Switzerland's decision to modify its law in 1995 was similarly
motivated.98
exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both"), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020040.htm (last visited May 22, 2005).
94. See John Pratt, Changes in UK Competition Law: A Wasted Opportunity,
15 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 89, 90 (1994).
95. See id. at 91; see also Aidan Robertson, The Reform of UK Competition
Law - Again, 17 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 210, 211 (1996) (citing a
governmental review of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1973, which
described it as too complex, providing for too many exemptions, and generally
inadequate in terms of investigative and punitive powers).
96. See U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., REVIEW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES POLICY: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, 1988, Cmnd. 331, at 31-33
(pointing out forty-seven categories of exemption, with the "professional services"
category containing seventeen sub-categories).
97. See Parker, supra note 91, at 290.
98. See OECD EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 85, 44, 47-49
(discussing the antitrust exemptions of the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland);
see also Sideek Mohamed, Competition Rules of Sweden and the European Union
Compared, 19 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 237, 237 (1998).
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Nevertheless, European convergence is not the sole factor driving
these changes. Japan's policy has followed a similar path.99 Like
Germany, Japan has a long history of encouraging cooperation
among its exporting firms. Before 1997, Japanese law permitted pure
export cartels to enter into agreements on price, quantity, quality, or
design, by notifying the Minister of International Trade and Industry
("MITI") within ten days of conclusion of the agreement. 00 MITI
could limit the export exemption if the agreement: 1) violated
Japanese treaties with foreign governments; 2) injured the interests
of importers or Japanese export trade; 3) contained unjustly
discriminatory content; 4) unjustly restricted participation in, or
withdrawal from, the agreement; or 5) unjustly injured the interest of
Japanese enterprises or consumers. 101
In the early 1990s, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC")
began to take "a tougher stance toward approving new exempted
cartels, and tried to examine various legal requirements more rigidly
so that no additional exempted cartels could be formed without
convincing specific and urgent necessity."' 1 2 Although cartels in
general, and export cartels in particular, used to be thought of in
Japan as a "useful tool to eliminate excessive competition," the JFTC
began a systematic overview of, and elimination of, its cartel
exemptions. 03 Between 1992 and 1995, according to a WTO Trade
Policy Review of Japan, "17 of 28 export cartels [were] abolished
while many others [were] reduced in scope."1' 4 By 1998, the number
of exempted export cartels had fallen to two. 05 These and other
99. See HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND
POLICIES OF JAPAN 353-69 (1994) (providing a concise overview of the history of
cartel policy in Japan and the treatment of exemptions).
100. See OECD EXPERT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 85, 14 (citing Export
and Import Trading Act, Law No. 299 of 1952 (Japan) (repealed 1997)).
101. Id.
102. See IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 99, at 357.
103. See id. at 354, 359.
104. See World Trade Org., Trade Policy Review of Japan, WTO Doc.
Press/TPRB/5 (1995), available through http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005).
105. See World Trade Org., Trade Policy Review: Japan, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/S/32, 17 (1998) (stating that "[n]ine of the 11 export cartels have been
abolished since 1995 . . . [while] [r]emaining export cartels, related either to
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related efforts culminated in the passage of the Omnibus Act to
Repeal and Reform Cartels and Other Systems Exempted from the
Application of the Antimonopoly Act under Various Laws
("Omnibus Act"), which repealed the previous explicit exemption for
export cartels, as well as twenty-nine of the thirty-five other criteria
for receiving exemption from antitrust liability.
106
Similarly, in 1999, Korea passed the Act on Regulating Undue
Concerted Activities from the Application of the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act ("Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act") "in
order to facilitate the market economy and keep up with international
trends by repealing or improving cartels permitted under individual
statutes."'0 7 By this time, Korea, like Japan, had already abolished
most export cartels. In addition, Korea took steps toward a more
general deregulation of import and export processes. A report by the
OECD noted the following:
Until 1999, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE)
had far-reaching authority to "maintain order" in the import and export
market. In February 1999, the Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act limited
MOCIE's co-ordinating power to exports of military equipment and
compliance with inter-governmental agreements. Moreover, the same Act
abolished the power of the Minister of Construction and Transportation to
co-ordinate bidding in foreign markets (KFTC 1999a, § 19). 1 8
protection of quality or intellectual property, or to import monopolies in partner
countries are to be abolished by end-1999"), available through
http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
106. See Fair Trade Comm'n of Japan, About the JFTC: Role of the JFTC: What
Practices are Subject to Control by the Antimonopoly? (documenting the effects of
the Omnibus Act on export cartel exemptions), at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/aboutjftc/role/q-3.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005); see also World Trade Org.,
Trade Policy Review of Japan, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/107, 9, 65 (October 9,
2002) ("There are no authorized export cartels in Japan. However, 22 types of
cartel [sic] are exempted from general prohibition of cartels under Japan's Anti-
Monopoly Act (section (5)(vii)).").
107. See Int'l Bar Ass'n, The Global Competition Forum, available at
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/asia.htm#korea (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
108. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., BACKGROUND REPORT: THE
ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM, 85 (1999), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/44/2497300.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
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This trend toward the elimination of explicit exemptions, as well
as reductions in the number of exemptions granted, reflects an
admirable attempt to make competition law and policy more
internally consistent. Many countries have been taking a much more
aggressive attitude toward both domestic and international cartels
that harm domestic competition. Under such circumstances, policies
to promote exactly the same kind of activities outside one's borders
seem logically inconsistent and contrary to the spirit of international
cooperation. These policy changes reflect the views of scholars such
as Spencer Weber Waller, who wrote fifteen years ago:
The idea of the notification and registration of export cartels on an
international basis is equally tempting but flawed. Transparency is a
valued goal, but it is of use, first and foremost, as a tool in the detection
and eradication of anticompetitive restraints and should not be used as a
justification for their perpetuation ... the best hope [is] that the national
export cartel will eventually join its discredited cousin, the traditional
international cartel, as an improper distortion of competition in
international trade subject to universal condemnation and prohibition.10 9
The impact of these policy changes, however, is less obvious.
Because countries have converged on language that restricts
enforcement to activities that harm domestic competition, the legal
status of export cartels is now more, not less, ambiguous. In addition,
less information exists regarding who participates in joint export
activities and where they target their activities. The questions, then,
are what would be an ideal competition policy with respect to joint
export activity and what kinds of enforcement mechanisms could
move us toward such a policy? There are essentially two types of
alternatives: the adoption of extraterritorial policies by national
governments or increased international cooperation. In some ways,
the most obvious resolution is the extraterritorial option: individual
nation states could ban any activity for export that is already
prohibited if targeted at the domestic market. There are obvious
problems with any extraterritorial solution, so we believe that
increased international cooperation is the preferred and more
effective solution. This cooperation could be informal, as undertaken
by the International Competition Network. Support for this
109. Waller, U.S. Antitrust Ambivalence, supra note 2, at 111-13.
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cooperation could also come from more information sharing among
competition authorities so that those nations adversely affected by
export cartels have the resources to respond. The strongest form of
international cooperation would be an international competition
authority with jurisdiction over collusive activity aimed at foreign
markets.
On the one hand, as we move toward more fully integrated global
markets, there is less reason to distinguish at all between domestic
cooperative activity and the same sort of activity aimed at exports. 10
If we have a general consensus that price fixing harms consumers,
then export exemptions benefit a nation only to the extent that they
harm foreign consumers. The policy is one of enriching oneself at the
expense of one's trading partners. A multilateral agreement to
eliminate these exemptions and treat price fixing the same wherever
it occurs, or in whatever market is targeted, would improve global
consumer welfare.
On the other hand, international cooperation and truly effective
competition policy requires respect for both national sovereignty and
differences in levels of development and the strength of domestic
competition across nation states. The real problem with a global ban
on "export cartels," whether achieved through international
cooperation or through the harmonization of domestic laws, is that it
ignores the unintended effects of such a policy. For many small
firms, especially from countries that have historically been less
involved in global markets, entry into global markets is an
overwhelming challenge. Cooperation among firms that increases the
number of participants in global markets makes competition more,
not less, effective. Especially for smaller countries, where the
alternative to a cooperative association is merger, elimination of
cooperation as a legal possibility could lead to consolidation and the
lessening of competition in the domestic market."'
110. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Economic
Development, Competition Policy and the WTO, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 19 (2003),
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20844_wps2917.pdf (last visited Mar.
3, 2005).
111. See Bhattacharjea, supra note 73, at 341-52 (discussing the impact of the
elimination of export cartels on developing countries); see also Ajit Singh,
Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development. A Developing
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We have seen exactly this kind of "unintended consequence" as a
result of the increased prosecution of "hard core" international
cartels. 2 For example, since the 1995 break up of a cartel among
producers of seamless steel tubes, the industry has substantially
reorganized. Every single former member of the cartel has either
exited the industry altogether, or joined in a merger or strategic
alliance with another former cartel member. The industry is more
consolidated, and it is hard to see how competition could be more
intense under the current industry structure than the earlier, explicitly
collusive, one.'
International cooperation provides an alternative that, if wisely
implemented, could limit the negative effects of collusion on
international markets without providing a regulatory incentive to
merger for small firms, especially in small or developing countries."I4
Such an agreement could require that competition officials meet a
higher standard to show that the cooperative activity did in fact harm
competition in some markets rather than the per se standard, which
Country Perspective on the European Community Proposals (2003), available at
http://www.ideaswebsite.org/feathm/aug2003/MCP.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
See generally FREDERIC M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICY, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL (2000).
112. See, e.g., Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Private
International Cartels and Their Effect on Developing Countries, in WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001 48-50, 59-60 (World Bank Jan. 9, 2001) (discussing
post-cartel restructuring in the seamless steel tube and vitamin industries),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/bkgroundpapers/levenstein.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005); see also Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow,
Cartel Duration and Organization Then and Now, at 15 (University of Michigan,
Working Paper) (July 2004).
113. See GEORGE SYMEONIDIS, THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION: CARTEL POLICY
AND THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 124-39
(2002) (providing a comprehensive study of an analogous period, and arguing that
the UK's adoption of a more systematic policy against collusion in the 1950s and
1960s led to increases in concentration in formerly collusive industries).
114. See Victor, supra note 1, at 581 (proposing a number of provisions that one
might include in a multilateral agreement on export cartels to allow for efficiency
enhancing ventures, and yet create more elaborate checks and balances to anti-
competitive ventures). For example, Victor recommends association registration,
increased sharing of information across countries, and increased prosecution. Id. at
579-81; see Bhattacharjea, supra note 73, at 355-57 (advocating a similar position,
but suggesting the use of anti-dumping rules at the WTO as the enforcement
mechanism, although modified to deal with "over-pricing" by foreign cartels).
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has become more common in the national laws of most high-income
countries. This policy would recognize that export associations may
provide essential resources to overcome barriers to entry to export
markets, and therefore, increase the competitiveness of international
markets.1 1 5 Rules should be established to give firms guidance as to
whether their activity is likely to meet international competition
standards, since one of the benefits of national export exemptions is
providing legitimate marketing associations with assurance that they
would not face domestic legal liability. A stronger policy would
place the burden of proof on export associations to show that they
need to cooperate in order to participate effectively in international
markets and that their activities indeed do not undermine
competition.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to have more uniform pro-competition policies,
many countries have chosen to eliminate or restrict the exemptions
that they provide to export cartels. Seventeen of the fifty-five
countries surveyed here do offer firms exemption from domestic
antitrust laws for export activity. Thirty-four provide no exemption
from antitrust laws for export activity, but exempt such activity
implicitly because their competition laws are silent on restrictive
activities that affect foreign markets. Within the last decade, at least
ten countries have rewritten their laws, moving from explicit
exemptions to this more passive policy of speaking only to the
domestic market. However, the construction of domestic antitrust
laws that only ban activity that harms domestic competition leaves a
vacuum in which export cartels can continue to operate with no
obvious or practical institution to provide oversight or prosecution of
their activities. Further, the elimination of reporting requirements has
reduced the information available concerning the activities of these
cooperative ventures among firms.
However, this is not to argue that we should revert to national
exemptions that seem to legitimize anti-competitive behavior that is
115. See Joel Davidow & Hal Shapiro, The Feasibility and Worth of a World
Trade Organization Competition Agreement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 49, 67 (2003),
which makes a similar argument.
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strongly condemned if conducted in domestic markets. Instead, we
suggest that international cooperation to regulate and prosecute
cooperative activity affecting international markets could rationalize
these policies and promote competition more effectively than the
current haphazard set of national laws. Especially if it includes
consideration of both market structure and barriers to entry into
international markets, international cooperation could help
competition authorities develop the dual capacity to detect and
prevent associations that undermine competition, and provide
assurance, reduced risk, and consistency for firms that cooperate, but
do not undermine competition. This would provide a more coherent
set of rules for firms than the current patchwork of export
exemptions. It could also provide flexibility reflecting the different
needs and levels of development of different countries without
abandoning the principles of competition.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF EXPORT ASSOCIATION
EXEMPTIONS IN EFFECT - SELECTED
COUNTRIESa
YEAR AUSTRALIAb GERMANY JAPAN U.S. U.S.
(ETC) (WP)
1970 35
1972 227 175
1973 180
1974 15
1975 69
1976 29
1977 7
1978 4 30
1979 6
1980 4 266 36
1981 7
1982 6
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YEAR AUSTRALIAb GERMANY JAPAN U.S.
(ETC) (WP)
1983 8 11
1984 13 43
1985 4 59
1986 0 68
1987 6 82
1988 3 95
1989 2 108
1990 1 119 22
1991 1 121
1992 1 190 28 131
1993 12 133
1994 5 140
1995 7 11 145 15
1996 2 234 148
1997 2 146
1998 2 36 2 144
1999 0 36 0 144
2000 6 0 0 147 11
2001 4 0 0 149 12
2002 4 0 0 150 13
2003 4(through 0 0 162 12June) _______ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __
a There are other countries that require notification, but data are not
available or complete enough for us to include in Table 1. For
example, New Zealand requires notification but does not approve or
authorize the cartel-it merely acknowledges receipt of the
notification. According to a government official, they receive few
notifications, on the order of one each year or one every two years.
They do not keep a register of notifications. (Information provided
via email, November 9, 2004.)
b Australia's numbers are not strictly comparable to the other
countries, because exemptions are given on individual transactions.
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Thus, these numbers represent the number of transactions exempted
each year (a flow), not the number of export cartels in effect (a
stock).
Sources:
Australia: Data provided by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission.
Germany: Joachim Schwalbach & Anja Schwerk, Stability of
German Cartels, in COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY, AND WELFARE:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MANFRED NEUMANN 101-28 (D.C. Mueller et
al. eds., 1999). The number in effect in 1998 and 1999 are taken
from OECD Competition Law and Policy, Annual Report, Germany
1998-1999, available at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00008000/M00008157.pdf and OECD
Competition Law and Policy, Annual Report, Germany 1999-2000,
available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M0008000/M00008069.pdf,
respectively.
Japan: Data refer to number of exemptions in force in March of each
year. Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions, at 6-7
(UNCTAD and Center for International Development Harvard
University, G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418en.pdf Table 12 at 17.
In 1998 it was reported that "Nine of I1 export cartels have been
abolished since 1995. Remaining export cartels, related either to
protection of quality or intellectual property, or to import monopolies
in partner countries are to be abolished by end-1999." World Trade
Org., Trade Policy Review: Japan, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/32, xiii(January 5, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpre/tp69e.htm. The 2002 Trade
Policy Review confirms that export cartels had disappeared. See
World Trade Org., Trade Policy Review of Japan, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/S/107, 9, 65 (October 9, 2002).
United States: ETC data taken from the U.S. Federal Register. The
"ETC" figures represent the total number of ETCs in existence in a
given year, after eliminating ETCs that were revoked. Only thirty-
seven ETCs have been revoked since 1983, so the difference
between the number of ETCs issued and the number in existence is
small. Webb Pomerene data is from Dick, supra note 8; FTC STAFF
REP., supra note 12; 2003 WPA Registration, supra note 14.
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TABLE 2: EXPORT ASSOCIATION EXEMPTIONS
FROM NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS -
SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Developing Countries noted with *)
COUNTRY( OM TRE EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION
(YEA NT OF STAT T CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTRELEVANT STATUTE)
Argentina* (1980) Implicit No
Australia (1974) Explicit Yes
Austria (1988) Implicit No
Belgium (1991) Implicit No
Brazil* (1994) Implicit No
Canada (1986) Explicit No
Chile* (1973) Implicit No
China* (1998) Implicit No
Czech Republic* (2001) Explicit No
Cyprus (2004) Implicit No
Denmark (2002) Implicit No
Egypt (2005) Implicit No
Estonia* (2001) Implicit No
Finland (2004) Explicit (vis-a-vis non- No
EU member states)
France (1986, amended 1996) Explicit No
Germany (1999) Implicit No
Greece (2000) Implicit No
Hungary* (1996) Implicit No
Iceland (2000) Explicit No
India* (2002) Explicit No
Indonesia* (1999) Explicit No
Ireland (2002) Implicit No
Israel (1988) Explicit Yes
Italy (1990) Implicit No
Japan (1947, amended 1997) Implicit No
Kenya* (1988) Implicit No
Korea (South) (1980) Implicit No
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COUNTRY( OM TRE EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION
(ELA N OFMOSTAT T CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTRELEVANT STATUTE)
Latvia* (2004) Implicit No
Lithuania* (1999) Explicit No
Luxembourg (2004) No statutory exemption -
Malta (1995) Implicit No
Mexico* (1993) Explicit No
Netherlands (1998) Implicit No
New Zealand (1986) Explicit Yes
Norway (1993) Explicit No
Pakistan* (1970) Implicit No
Poland* (1990) Implicit No
Portugal (1993) Implicit No
Russia* (2002) No statutory exemption -
Singapore (2004) Implicit No
Slovak Republic* (2001) Explicit No
South Africa* (1998) Explicit Yes
Spain (1989) Implicit No
Sri Lanka* (1987, 2003) Implicit No
Sweden (1994) Implicit No
Switzerland (1995) Implicit No
Taiwan (1992) Explicit Yes
Tanzania* (1994) Implicit No
Thailand* (1999) No statutory exemption -
Turkey* (1994) Implicit No
United Kingdom (1998) Implicit No
United States (1890) Explicit Yes
Uruguay* (2000) No statutory exemption -
Venezuela* (1992) Implicit No
Zambia* (1994) Implicit No
[20:785
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TABLE 3: RECENT CHANGES IN EXPORT
ASSOCIATION EXEMPTIONS FROM NATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAWS
DATEOF OLD NEWCOUNTRY EXEMPTION EXEMPTIONPOLICY POLICY
Cyprus 2004 Explicit Implicit
Implicit (explicit
Explicit with exemptions in
Germany 1999 notification limited
circumstances)
Hungary 2004 Explicit with Implicit
notification
Japan 1997 Explicit with Implicit
notification
Korea 1999 Explicit Implicit
Netherlands 1998 Explicit Implicit
Switzerland 1995 Explicit Implicit
Sweden 1994 Explicit Implicit
United 1998 Explicit with Implicit
Kingdom notification
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